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Abstract 
This paper explores the cultivation, institutionalisation and mediation of the image of Hassan 
Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese political party Hizbullah. It explores how this image 
changes according to socio-political contexts and how it works to construct a constant 
interchange of communally-relevant knowledge intended to appeal to and mobilise different 
groups in certain junctures. As such, the paper pays attention to the methods, tools and 
practices used to construct Nasrallah‟s mediated persona and Nasrallah‟s role in self-
mediation processes. The paper concludes with the challenges to Nasrallah‟s mediated image 
and charismatic authority posed by Lebanon‟s contentious internal politics and his support for 
the Syrian regime in its efforts to suppress the uprising that began in March 2011.  
         Keywords: Nasrallah, Hizbullah, political communication, image of presence, 
moblization, culture 
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Hassan Nasrallah: The Cultivation of image and language in the making of a charismatic 
leader 
Populist movements, as well as formal and informal political groups, have often used 
charismatic leaders, symbols, imagery and language to mobilise supporters and enhance their 
appeal. Hizbullah, the Lebanese „Party of God‟, is no exception–indeed, the group has been 
remarkable for its efforts in cultivating and disseminating a symbolic and inspirational image 
of its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah as a charismatic leader whose own personal ethos, 
integrity and credibility have created a following even outside Hizbullah‟s main constituency, 
the Shi‟as of Lebanon. Since his appointment as secretary-general in 1992, but particularly 
following the liberation of southern Lebanon in 2000 and the 2006 war with Israel, Nasrallah 
has been a highly visible celebrity-like leader with a substantial following. Rarely absent 
from the public space, Nasrallah‟s appearances are publicised ahead of time by Hizbullah‟s 
multi-media platforms, including newspapers, the television channel al-Manar (the beacon) 
and different websites, as dramatic political performances that demand urgent attention and 
action. Political performances, or spectacles, are key constituents of political life as they can 
play an important role in securing the consent of the public, reinforce obedience, and, as Lisa 
Wedeen has argued, “anchor visually and audibly politically significant ideas‟ as well as 
frame the ways people see themselves as citizens “ (1999, pp. 19-20). The processes of 
mediation, Dick Pels (2003) suggests, can create a sense of false intimacy between the leader 
and the led and disrupt the traditional divide between the elites and the masses and between 
the formal and informal (Pels, 2003). Such aspects of the mediation processes are true of 
Nasrallah‟s political  performances, which, along with his own ethos, conversational mode of 
address and skilful use of potent religious-political language  have produced an effective, if 
not powerful, mediated „image of presence‟ that appeared to bring his target populations 
NASRALLAH: THE CULTIVATION OF IMAGE AND LANGUAGE 3 
together as an imagined community, particularly in moments of socio-political crises. This 
articulation of the Althusserian concept of interpellation (summoning) does not mean the act 
of summoning fully succeeds in the sense that they are accepted by the target audiences. 
Indeed, analysis of political rhetoric must also explore those moments when these 
interpellations are subverted or resisted. However, such a discussion is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
The argument this paper makes, and elaborates, is that Nasrallah‟s „image of presence‟ 
has been worked on, maintained, institutionalised and validated through a sophisticated and 
adaptive political communication strategy that ran hand in hand with Hizbullah‟s evolution 
since its inception in 1982. The strategy combines elements of political marketing strategies 
with a culturally-sensitive model of mobilisation that actively selects, appropriates and 
disseminates meaningful symbols, images and language to construct and sustain a constant 
interchange of communally-relevant knowledge intended to appeal to and mobilize target 
groups in certain historical junctures. With this in mind, this article pays attention to the 
methods, tools and practices Hizbullah used to validate Nasrallah‟s religious–political 
persona and to Nasrallah‟s own involvement in mediation processes.  As Roger Silverstone 
(2002) argues, mediation is dialectical, balancing potential opportunities with structures, but 
it is also uneven with some actors more powerful than others.  
Before doing so, the paper briefly traces Nasrallah‟s rise within Hizbullah‟s 
hierarchical structures. It then focuses on the transformation of Nasrallah‟s image from a 
devout religious leader to Hizbullah‟s first charismatic leader in the media age while relating 
the change to specific historical contexts. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the 
challenges to Nasrallah‟s mediated image of presence and charismatic authority posed by 
Lebanon‟s contentious internal politics and his (and Hizbullah‟s) support for the Syrian 
regime in its efforts to suppress the uprising that began in March 2011.  
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Nasrallah: The dynamics of structure and agency 
Hassan Nasrallah was born on 31 August 1960 in a neighbourhood in East Beirut. His 
family was not particularly religious or political. His father Abdelkarim Nasrallah was a 
vegetable and fruit salesman, who moved to the capital Beirut from Bazouriyeh, a small 
predominantly Shi„a village three miles east of the coastal town of Tyre in south Lebanon. 
From an early age, Nasrallah was attracted to learning and theological studies because, as he 
put it in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper Nida‟ al-Watan, “of the milieu I lived in,” 
(Nasrallah, 1993) in reference to his early association with the fledgling community of 
politically engaged Shi„ite Islamists that began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s. Nasrallah‟s 
family relocated to Bazouriyeh in largely Shiite southern Lebanon at the beginning of the 
Lebanese civil war in 1975. During that period, he began to be attracted to political 
organisations, joining harakat al-mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) established by 
the Lebanese Shii Imam Musa al-Sadr who disappeared in mysterious conditions in Libya in 
1978. Nasrallah‟s aim was to travel to the city of Najaf in Iraq to pursue his religious studies, 
and he travelled there in 1976. During this period, little was known of Hassan Nasrallah or of 
his oratorical skills and charismatic qualities.  
In 1978, Nasrallah was forced to escape to Lebanon after the Iraqi Baathist regime 
launched a major crackdown against Shiite Islamists. When he returned to Lebanon, he re-
joined the Shiite political formational Amal, but left again when the schism widened between 
its secular and Islamist members. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied south 
Lebanon until finally withdrawing in 2000. The invasion, which seriously damaged 
Lebanon‟s infrastructure, killed thousands of people, forced the break-up of old alliances and 
the making of new ones and once again brought in Western troops to Beirut has been often 
cited as the most important factor behind the emergence of Hizbullah as a resistance and 
social force. By 1985, the year when Hizbullah published its Open Letter, its quasi-political 
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manifesto that outlined the party‟s aims and ideology. The manifesto detailed Hizbullah‟s 
objectives and aims, including ending Israel‟s occupation of parts of Lebanon, the group‟s 
commitment to Iran and its leaders and the preference for Islamic rule in Lebanon. Nasrallah 
was put in charge of Hizbullah‟s activities in Beirut. Within two years, he was appointed 
chief executive officer in Hizbullah‟s consultative council, gaining more clout and attracting 
the admiration of peers. A veteran Hizbullah official recalls that even when Sheikh Abbas al-
Mussawi was elected secretary-general in 1989, “it was his protégé who drew the eyes of the 
party‟s files and ranks” (Blandford, 2007, p.7). 
Hassan Nasrallah was elected Hizbullah‟s secretary-general on 18 February 1992, two 
days after the assassination of al-Mussawi- he was the council‟s unanimous choice. His 
appointment coincided with a transformation in Hizbullah‟s image from an Islamist 
resistance movement working outside the Lebanese system to a national Lebanese party 
playing by the political rules. Nasrallah supported the moves towards integration and 
Hizbullah‟s participation in the 1992 elections, the first after the 1975-1990 civil war, was to 
demonstrate that its transitional from an Islamist movement into a mainstream party was 
genuinely nationalist in orientation. At the helm, Nasrallah initiated a campaign aimed at 
widening Hizbullah‟s reach, and supervised the development of social, educational and 
communication services as well as heavy investments in diverse media platforms. Hizbullah 
had a clear and organised media plan since the 1990s and continued to develop its media 
platforms along with its evolution and changing role in Lebanon. By 2013, the group‟s multi-
media platforms included its own newspaper, al-Intiqad (literally meaning criticism) and 
which was formerly called al-‘Ahd (the pledge) its own satellite television station al-Manar 
(the beacon) several websites, including one for al-Manar offered in multiple languages 
(Arabic, English, French), and its own radio station al-Nour (the light). Hizbullah also 
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produces children‟s games, merchandise, books, computer games, as well as posters and 
billboards, to reach out to multiple audiences.  
The roots of the transformation of Nasrallah‟s image were laid in the second half of the 
1990s when Hizbullah increased the number of its resistance operations against Israeli forces. 
The turning point came on 11 April 1996 when Israel launched „the Grapes of Wrath‟ 
military operation culminating in the Qana massacre in which more than 100 Lebanese 
civilians were killed by Israeli shelling as they sought shelter in a UN complex. The offensive 
and the massacre served to draw attention to Hizbullah‟s role as a viable national resistance 
party, particularly as Hizbullah‟s media intensified its campaigns to underline the role of the 
party in the resistance and the defence of the country. Indeed, Hizbullah‟s popular appeal and 
new political status, as the party defending Lebanon, produced a new media strategy aimed at 
improving performance and countering Israeli propaganda messages (see Harb, 2011). 
On the political front, the signing of the April Understanding aimed at ending hostilities 
with Israel gave Nasrallah increasing negotiating powers in Lebanon, particularly as he 
constructed the agreement as a victory for Hizbullah. In an interview with the Lebanese 
newspaper As-Safir on 30 April 1996, he argued that“... [the] understanding is a new attempt 
at ensuring the protection of Lebanese civilians....that we are bound by it, and agree to its 
terms. As for the movement of resistance, it remains intact.....We believe that what happened 
was a great victory and that it was above all a victory for the Lebanese people-...”(Nasrallah, 
1996). Nasrallah would later use the trope of victory to describe other significant moments in 
Hizbullah‟s history, such as the 2000 Israeli troop withdrawal from south Lebanon and the 
2006 July war between Lebanon and Israel. 
On 12 September 1997, Nasrallah‟s populist image changed almost overnight when his 
18-year-old son Hadi was killed in a military operation against Israel, but it was Nasrallah‟s 
dignified reaction to his son‟s death and his tadhiya (sacrifice) of his son (according to 
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Hizbullah and popular discourse) that saw a cross-sectarian, impassioned outpouring of 
emotions and support for a man who had lost his eldest son. Al-Manar broadcast live 
Nasrallah‟s speech reacting to the news, blending it with footage showing him visiting the 
families of other martyrs (Manarnet, 2009).  The station repeated the broadcast numerous 
times, turning Nasrallah‟s reaction and the outpouring of support into a continuous media 
event that served to bring Lebanese nationals together as a collective. From that date 
onwards, Hizbullah‟s multi-media platforms, and a variety of Arab commentators, began to 
project Nasrallah as an extraordinary selfless leader and an organic leader with deep roots in 
popular culture. In Egypt, Magdi Hussein wrote in Ash-Sha’b (the people) newspaper on 23 
September 1997: „This aggressive action has turned into a new victory for the mujahidin. No 
one knew that Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah would send his son of 18 years old to the front 
lines… At a time when many (Arab) politicians in government and in opposition provide 
their children with different aspects of a life of luxury, we see here an ascending Islamist 
model [of selflessness]. This wonderful model shows us how Nasrallah refused negotiations 
with Israel to retrieve the body of his martyred son. …it is a model that will remain a source 
of inspiration for all in the Arab and Muslim worlds” (Magdi, 1997). When a deal was 
reached to exchange the remains of dead Israeli soldiers for Lebanese prisoners and bodies, 
Nasrallah did not put his son‟s name ahead of other resistance fighters‟ bodies, leading one 
commentator to write in al-Kifah al-„Arabi (the Arab Struggle): “He (Nasrallah) is more than 
a symbol; he is charismatic, articulate, straightforward and a mastermind in politics...With 
Hassan Nasrallah, the political scenery seems to be different” (cited in Harb, 2011, p. 195). 
The liberation of the south of Lebanon on 25 May 2000 was another turning point in 
the evolution of Nasrallah‟s popular image. The liberation was a watershed and major 
achievement in Hizbullah‟s history as it was the first time Israeli troops were forced to retreat 
from Arab lands at the hands of an Arab paramilitary group since 1948, when Israel was 
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created. Widely credited to Hizbullah‟s resistance operations against Israeli forces, the 
liberation cemented the group‟s image as the party of resistance in Lebanon and confirmed 
Nasrallah as one of the most respected populist leaders in the Arab world. Marking the 
occasion, Nasrallah addressed a 100,000-strong crowd in an open-air venue in the southern 
town of Bint Jbeil, his language merging Hizbullah‟s Islamic identity with Lebanon‟s 
national one while also framing the withdrawal as a victory for all Lebanese people, 
irrespective of their political or religious affiliations. His speech was broadcast repeatedly by 
al-Manar television and continues to be broadcast and referred to on the annual anniversary 
of the liberation of the South. Within five years, however, the assassination of Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February 2005 dented Hizbullah‟s credibility as it helped 
bring domestic political tensions and disquiet about Hizbullah‟s insistence on keeping its 
arms into the open. Nasrallah condemned the assassination as an anti-nationalist act and 
called for parliamentary consultations to appoint a new prime minister.  
The 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel was, however, the most ultimate historical 
event that helped the transformation of Nasrallah from a humble religious leader into 
Hizbullah‟s first charismatic leader in the media age. The broad consensus following the war 
in which more than 1,000 people were killed and almost a million displaced was that 
Hizbullah not only worn the war against Israel, but also managed to enhance its appeal within 
and outside Lebanon. Crucially, the war was the first regional armed conflict to be televised 
round the clock with Hizbullah‟s media providing details of all developments - Nasrallah‟s 
interviews, statements and speeches were all televised in full and re-broadcast to thousands of 
audiences in Lebanon, the Arab world and beyond, who followed each word attentively. 
However, it was Nasrallah‟s speech marking the end of the war that captured the Lebanese 
and pan-Arab imagination, cementing the elevation of his popular status from a leader of a 
small Islamist group to the symbol of pan-Arab national heroism par excellence.  
NASRALLAH: THE CULTIVATION OF IMAGE AND LANGUAGE 9 
It is not possible to detail all elements of this speech which reflected Nasralllah‟s skills 
in fusing religious and political language to summon his audiences as an “imagined” national 
collective and describing the end of the war as a „Divine Victory‟ and a „political victory‟ for 
all Lebanese:  
Our victory is not the victory of the party.... it is not the victory of a party or a 
community; rather it is a victory for Lebanon, for the real Lebanese people, and every 
free person in the world. ….Your resistance, which offered in the 2000 victory a 
model for liberation, offered in the year 2006 a model for steadfastness; legendary 
steadfastness and miraculous steadfastness. It is strong proof for all Arabs and 
Muslims, and all rulers, armies and peoples…The Lebanese resistance provided 
strong proof to all Arab and Islamic armies. ...This is the equation. Today, your 
resistance broke the image of Israel. (Mwali Alkhamenei, 2011) 
The construction of Nasrallah’s image and charisma in popular culture 
The available literature on Hassan Nasrallah – mostly a collection of quasi-biographies, 
books, articles, images and archival material of his speeches, his achievements and his 
religious engagements – recounts his life story as a classical linear narrative of a „genuine‟ or 
„pure‟ charismatic leader endowed with pre-authored, extraordinary skills. While there is as 
yet no full-length English-language biography of Nasrallah, a handful of books, pamphlets 
and other material detailing aspects of Nasrallah‟s life and his charismatic appeal have been 
produced by Hizbullah‟s various publishing houses following the 2006 war.  
Most of these publications tell the same story – that of a humble, religious, visionary, 
authentic and credible leader who has charisma and who was destined to follow a 
revolutionary path. An example is a book titled 
The Heavenly and Strategic Visions in the Leadership of Hassan Nasrallah) published in 
2008 by Dar al-Amir, a Hizbullah-affiliated publishing house. Another is an illustrated 
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children‟s book titled al-Faris al-‘A -
-qiyada (The Arab Knight: the Life Story of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah from 
Birth to Leadership) which uses cartoons, images of Nasrallah, posters and newspaper 
clippings and taps into a reservoir of symbolic and sacred figures to appeal to children 
already familiar with this reservoir and its meanings.  
In his systemic, functional and broadly Eurocentric analysis of authority structures, 
Max Weber (1978, pp. 122-3) argued that „genuine‟ or pure charisma was a feature of ancient 
societies. He wrote: “Where charisma is genuine … its basis lies … in the conception that it 
is the duty of those subject to charismatic authority to recognize its authenticity … 
Psychologically, this recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of 
the quality.”  Weber also suggested that charismatic authority was different from other forms 
of authority as it was distinctly personal and rested on the “devotion to the specific sanctity, 
heroism, or exemplary character of the extraordinary charismatic order, but that genuine 
charisma becomes unstable as enthusiasm and fervour disappear through discipline and 
habituation” (1978, ibid).  
Ruth Willner (1985, pp. 5-8), drawing on Weber‟s articulation, proposes four criteria 
that distinguish charismatic leadership from other types of leadership. These are: the leader‟s 
image, which suggests that followers believe the leader possesses superhuman and 
extraordinary characteristics; receptivity, which means followers believe the leader‟s 
statements because it is he or she who makes them; compliance, meaning followers obey the 
leader; and emotions, which mean a leader provokes intense emotional responses from his or 
her followers. Willner also argues that a common misconception about charisma is the 
linking of the qualities of the charismatic leader to the personality of the individual who is 
credited with it: “There is a popular notion that charisma is located in a quality or 
combination of qualities of a person and that some leaders naturally possess a charismatic 
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personality while most do not” (ibid, p. 14). Thus, attempts to locate a set of qualities that 
would qualify calling political leaders charismatic are unlikely to yield results because 
charisma is, she suggests, defined in terms of people‟s perceptions of and responses to a 
leader. It is not what the leader is, but what people see the leader is that counts in generating 
the charismatic relationship. As such, the distinction between charismatic political leadership 
and charismatic authority rests on the extent of the radius of charismatic support. She writes: 
“If and when a charismatic political leader converts the majority members of a system into 
his charismatic constituency, his charisma also becomes the basis for authority in that system 
…” (ibd, pp. 16-17). 
While determining the popular reception of Nasrallah‟s charismatic authority and image 
of presence is difficult to achieve accurately, popular responses to his public performances 
and image do suggest his charisma is defined in terms of what people say about him. For 
example, in certain parts of Lebanon, and particularly in the Beirut Shiite-dominated suburb 
, Nasrallah is revered as a leader and as a popular icon, as reflected in comments by 
a variety of people this author spoke to between 2007 and 2010. Some comments refer to him 
as “Nasrallah is the leader we look up to and follow,” and “he is the only one defending us,” 
or “Nasrallah does not exaggerate when talking and does not make things up.” Other 
statements and press commentaries, too, describe him as an unusual, charismatic and 
extraordinary man, but with a humane and informal demeanor.  
Paradoxically, people often describe him as ordinary, a man of the street and a brother 
among equals, suggesting the blurring of the boundaries between the leader and the led. Some 
commentaries refer to his austere and simple lifestyle (he is reported to continue to sleep on a 
hard mattress on the floor rather than a sumptuous bed), his friendly and conversational mode 
of address as well as his truthfulness as personal attributes that reveal he is an „organic‟ 
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leader rooted in Lebanon‟s everyday culture. For example, as Suha Dabbagh said in a 
personal communication with the author in Beirut on November 11, 2011: 
Nasrallah comes across as a normal man who does not irritate people with his airs and 
graces like other Arab leaders. I like his way of talking, no high politics or subterfuge. 
During the 2006 war, I was looking for a hero, and I found him in Nasrallah. And this 
was not a movie. Nasrallah does not exaggerate or make things up. … He has the 
spirit of youth in him, unlike those other [Arab] leaders who look like fossils. He uses 
the language of the street, but it is not street language (S. Dabbagh, personal 
communication, November 11, 2011) 
Simon Coleman (2009, pp. 417-439) has argued that the potential for a charismatic 
response depends on a leader‟s ability to form a charismatic presence and landscape that 
constitutes the charisma of the exemplar. Roy Wallis (1984, pp. 25-39) also suggests that the 
potential for a response further depends on the efforts of those elites surrounding the leader 
intended to enhance the recognition of the leader...endowing him with still further 
significance as author of the movement and their own fortunate condition, leading him to take 
evermore seriously the conception of himself as someone out-of-the-ordinary. With this in 
mind,  this paper next examines the methods, tools and practices Hizbullah uses to cultivate, 
legitimise and popularise Nasrallah‟s „image of presence‟ as well as Nasrallah‟s own agency 
in creating a charismatic presence particularly in moments of socio-political crisis.   
Appropriating Nasrallah’s image in culture 
Drawing on an analysis of archival material and fieldwork in Lebanon, this paper argues that 
Hizbullah‟s diverse media platforms began cultivating Nasrallah‟s image as soon as he was 
appointed the group‟s secretary-general in 1992. While few details of the decision-making 
process were made public, Hizbullah‟s official mouthpiece al-‘Ahd newspaper published two 
front-page black-and-white images of the new leader under the headline and inscription: „The 
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best of successors to the best of predecessors.‟ The phrase, rich in historical symbolism and 
meanings, is an example of the powerful, symbolic and meaningful language the group use to 
legitimize Nasrallah as a credible and authentic religious-political ideologue who has the 
necessary credentials to lead. On 7 June 1992, a few days after his appointment, the paper 
printed in full Nasrallah‟s first interview as secretary-general conducted with the popular 
Lebanese daily as-Safir conducted a few days earlier and in which Nasrallah himself sought 
to construct an image of himself, and his party, as more inclusive than other actors in 
Lebanese society: 
When we were just a small group fighting the Israeli enemy, we were able to hide 
underground whenever we read in the papers that there was a reason for us to 
disappear….but soon we became a large movement and started viewing our project as 
non-partisan and non-factional, and one that operates at the level of the Lebanese 
people and the nation as a whole and not a sectarian or party project….. The fact that 
we are engaged in an existential battle with Israel is an honour….we view the Israeli 
enemy with a different eye – namely, that its very existence in the region poses a 
constant threat to Lebanon as a whole. (Nasrallah, 1992) 
         John Corner (2003, p. 69) has argued that the mediation of political personas and their 
image can project leaders in three broad modes; iconically – in the sense of displaying the 
demeanour, posture and associative contexts of the political self; vocally, reflected in the 
increasing blurring of the “what” is said with “how” it is said as well as between the personal 
and political; and finally, kinetically which is associated with choreographing of political 
performances and actions (Corner, 2003, p. 67). These aspects of the mediation processes 
apply to Nasrallah. In fact, a close analysis of Nasrallah‟s public performances shows that he 
constantly fuses the how with the what, or, in other words, the style of delivery with rhetoric. 
In terms of style, Nasrallah‟s mode of address is more conversational than formal – he often 
NASRALLAH: THE CULTIVATION OF IMAGE AND LANGUAGE 14 
goes off script, uses vernacular rather than classical Arabic and jokes (he often makes fun of 
himself, too), thus humanising his political persona. Nasrallah also uses a political discourse 
accessible to ordinary people while articulating their sense of self and already-felt grievances 
– he often makes references to the oppressed and Hizbullah‟s efforts to fight injustice and the 
oppressors. Furthermore, Nasrallah adapts different linguistic, cultural and religious registers 
while crafting a powerful religious-political, and yet simple historical narrative, that mixes 
frames of suffering and redemption with tropes of  resistance and/or struggle for the land and 
that promises divine rewards for those who follow him and respond. Nasrallah‟s statements 
are rich in imagery, symbolic references and culturally-meaningful frames of reference that 
integrate Islamic frames of reference and heroic figures from the past with a potent discourse 
of resistance to Israel and its allies that remain relevant to contemporary historical and 
political contexts (Matar, 2008, pp. 122-37). Finally, Nasrallah is skilful in adapting his 
image and language to summon different audiences in diverse historical junctures. For 
example, he projects himself as a religious persona by reminding Hizbullah‟s supporters of 
the need to follow the right path [of resistance and struggle]; as an Arab leader by reiterating 
the significance of resistance against Israel and through leading (and addressing) the annual 
Jerusalem Day celebrations; and as a Lebanese national by calling for cooperation and 
national dialogue amongst the country‟s various factions to preserve Lebanon‟s sovereignty.  
However, while he changes his political-religious rhetoric to suit diverse audiences 
and contexts, Nasrallah‟s discourse has three main constants: First, he peppers his talks with 
citations from the Quran, references to the Prophet Mohammad and his descendants. Second, 
Nasrallah addresses his audiences frequently by using the personal pronoun „antum‟ (you), 
provoking a sense of familiarity that is enhanced by his switching between intimate language 
(such as when he uses colloquial „ammiyyah Arabic) and formal Arabic (as when 
quoting from the Qur‘an). Finally, Nasrallah employs different layers of speech designed to 
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appeal to a particular audience: For example, to a mainly Shiite audience, Nasrallah frames 
jihad (struggle) as a purely religious duty that transcends all other aims, and the conflict with 
Israel as the first part of a campaign aimed at liberating Jerusalem and other Muslim holy 
places. To a wider Lebanese audience, Nasrallah frames jihad in national terms invoking the 
term muqawama (resistance). To a larger Arab audience, Nasrallah presents armed struggle 
as part of a wider Arab nationalist cause against Israel, the United States and their allies. And 
to an international audience, Nasrallah frames Hizbullah‟s activities as part of a liberation 
struggle against an illegal occupation force (see Palmer, 2007, pp. 57-58). 
The power of mediation 
The transformation of Hassan Nasrallah into Hizbullah‟s foremost charismatic leader at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, this paper suggests, is the outcome of Hizbullah‟s 
political communication strategy which ran hand in hand with the group‟s political evolution 
since 1982. This strategy, it argues, succeeded in constructing Nasrallah‟s person as an 
„image of presence‟ that, as Roland Barthes (2000, p. 200) writes, “intervenes without 
warning on the place of denotation....in order to pass off as merely denoted, a message which 
is really heavily connoted.” Nasrallah‟s speeches, interviews, rallies and engagements – 
indeed, his every utterance –are constructed by Hizbullah‟s various media platforms as 
dramatic political performances that demand attention.  
The sense of drama is heightened and communicated in a variety of ways. For example, 
before Nasrallah is due to make an address, Hizbullah‟s television al-Manar would broadcast 
segments of videos showing him addressing audiences on other occasions, the clips often 
interspersed with images of Hizbullah fighters in battle and pictures of destroyed Israeli 
armoury. Al-Manar, for example, regularly broadcasts songs, some of them with phrases from 
Nasrallah‟s speeches, while showing images of Nasrallah in conversation with Hizbulah 
fighters or with ordinary people. Furthermore, Nasrallah‟s appearances, whether on television 
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or in public spaces, are announced ahead of time –some of these announcements are in the 
form of printed informal invites detailing the time and place of Nasrallah‟s engagements and 
published in al-Intiqad and on Hizbullah‟s main website al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic 
Resistance), while others are open invites to the general public, advertised by al-Manar at 
regular intervals.  
The sense of anticipation before he is due to make an address is heightened by repeated 
broadcasts of his previous appearances, images of the audience waiting for him while waving 
the canary flags of Hizbullah and Nasrallah‟s pictures and banners with the word labbaika 
(we will act on your demands) or fida’ al-sayyed‟ (meaning, a sacrifice to Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah), reflecting a deep emotional bond with, and loyalty to, him. Finally, Nasrallah‟s 
public appearances, particularly at public rallies, are important commemorative events in and 
by themselves. His addresses often mark important historical and highly symbolic occasions 
and commemorative practices – Martyrs‟ Day; Jerusalem Day: Liberation Day; the 
anniversary of (the late Iranian spiritual leader) Ayatollah Khomeini‟s death – and as such, 
they become associated in audiences‟ minds with commemorative practices that serve to 
underline the central rhetorical and political motifs in Hizbullah‟s worldview and provide a 
counter-historical narrative of struggle against oppression and occupation. 
Following the 2006 war, Hizbullah‟s media outlets began publishing sentimental songs 
and poems in praise of Nasrallah. Some of these are authored by Arab nationals, such as 
Syrian Omar al-Farra, In one poem, al-Farra refers to Nasrallah as a „noble knight‟ from „ahl 
al-bayt (a reference of those Muslims who inhabit the house of the Prophet Mohammed, in 
other words his followers who had come along to alleviate the suffering of the deprived, a 
language that resonates with popular Shiite aesthetics and collective memory. A popular 
song, too, highlights his religious credentials by ending with the phrase: “Oh Hussein, we had 
come back with Nasrallah,” thus making links to the lineage of the most revered leader in 
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Shiite history. This is a reference to Imam Hussein who was killed along with his band of 
supporters in the battle of Karbala in 680 becoming a symbol of sacrifice in Shiite history. 
Other popular songs are intended to appeal to the wider Lebanese and Arab publics. One 
example is the song (my beloveds) by Lebanese singer Julia Boutros, whose lyrics 
are adapted from Nasrallah‟s victory speech following the 2006 war. The climax of the song 
comes with the appearance of a group of able-bodied Hizbullah fighters running through 
Lebanese woods and the words: “You are the glory of our nation, you are our leaders, you are 
the crown on our head; you are the masters” (Tama ara, 2008). 
Hizbullah also displayed images and religious iconography depicting Nasrallah with 
other revered Muslim Shi„ite leaders along roads, on the walls of buildings in the streets of 
Beirut and elsewhere. Some of these are portraits of the Hizbullah leader, but others have 
inscriptions referring to his religious and national credentials. For example, one poster has the 
picture of Nasrallah with the words „Nasrallah, the sun of Palestine‟ inscribed under a 
photograph of the Dome of the Rock, the mosque that symbolises Jerusalem to many 
Muslims and Arabs. Others show Nasrallah holding children, laughing, addressing crowds or 
with Hizbullah fighters. Hizbullah also produced and sold a varied assortment of merchandise 
– key rings, posters and other memorabilia – to reflect support and admiration for Nasrallah. 
There are stickers that show Nasrallah in different guises and places and there are even some 
showing his well-known bodyguards who are a constant presence in all his public 
appearances. Nasrallah also appears in posters of Hizbullah martyrs. In these posters, he is 
often seen smiling, suggesting their death should be celebrated, not mourned. Combined, all 
these products maintain what Barthes (2000, p. 203) calls a “photographic syntax,” or “a 
discursive reading of object-signs within a single photograph.” Indeed, the signifiers in the 
photographic syntax – in this case, the persona of Nasrallah as well as the background behind 
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his image (such as flags, colours, graphics and inscriptions) - emerge as guiding tropes and 
signs for society in particular historical contexts.  
As such, the 2006 war was the ultimate socio-historical juncture that helped turn 
Nasrallah into a pan-Arab political force and served to legitimise his charismatic authority. 
Support for Nasrallah, and Hizbullah, extended to the Arab world where citizens in different 
capitals carried Nasrallah‟s image as an identity marker and as a symbol of Arab nationalism, 
provoking comparisons with the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser whose 
nationalist stance and policies were supported by many Arab nationals in the late 60s and 
early 70s.  
Rising challenges to Nasrallah’s charismatic image 
However, within weeks of the end of the war, Hizbullah‟s position and Nasrallah‟s image 
were dented following allegations that Hizbullah members were involved in the assassination 
of Hariri. With domestic political tension escalating, Hizbullah began a new phase in its 
political communication strategy aimed at validating Nasrallah‟s standing in the public 
sphere and maintain popular support for the group.  In this context, the group launched a 
coordinated marketing campaign to reclaim legitimacy and appeal to supporters. The 
campaign was marked with the publication of several books about his life history that 
included lengthy testimonies from his family and party members and media programmes 
detailing his achievements. Among these was a production by al-Manar that used a movie-
like trailer with English translations broadcasting key quotations from Nasrallah‟s speeches 
as Hizbullah and nationalist songs playing in the background (Personal videos from Moh, 
20012). In addition, the station continuously re-broadcast some of Nasrallah‟s most 
significant speeches, using a combination of visual effects and a variety of sound tracks. 
Some of these programmes played religious chants while others used nationalist songs 
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reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s Arab nationalist productions, reminding their audiences 
of Nasrallah‟s religious and national attributes. 
In March and April 2010, the Hizbullah-sympathetic newspaper al-Diyar began a series 
of articles as part of a comprehensive file about Nasrallah, his life and his achievements, 
published in two instalments. In the first instalment, writer Radwan al-Dheeb provided 
narrative after narrative of Nasrallah‟s life history, sacrifices and credibility. The second was 
a hand-written statement by Nasrallah telling his life story, and which was first published on 
12 May 2006 in the Tehran-based magazine Risalat al-  (the Letter of Hussein). 
There were lengthy testimonies from members of his family (including his father, sister, 
mother and wife) and supporters as well as other Hizbullah leaders reiterating his 
extraordinary qualities, his dedication to resistance and his heroic deeds.  Most of the reports 
tell the same story: that of a charismatic, eloquent religious-political ideologue and an 
inspirational leader whose charismatic deeds influenced the history of Lebanon as no other 
leader had done. For example, Al-Dheeb wrote on 20 March 2010: “He (Nasrallah) is a 
leader who looks to history with the future in perspective…He acts on the basis of the belief 
that stems from the people‟s hopes and potential. He does not surrender or wait in resignation 
until helped by others.” Another commentary published in the same paper on the same date 
ponders Nasrallah‟s humane and sentimental side, while emphasising his rootedness in Arab 
and Islamic history: “He is) an inclusive and forgiving leader, the defender of Arab 
civilisation and culture… a feat he achieved through his and his party‟s actions…Nasrallah is 
the „Khomeini‟of the Arabs” (Al-Dheeb, 2010). 
The mediation of Hassan Nasrallah‟s image of presence and charismatic authority, this 
paper argues, produced powerful effects during an inter-related set of historically-specific 
constellations of social, cultural and political and institutional forces, helping Nasrallah 
transcend political-ideological legacies in Lebanon and establish himself as a national and 
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Arab hero. However, a complex set of unprecedented historically-specific constellations, such 
as the Arab uprisings that began in 2011, was bound to challenge Nasrallah‟s image as the 
ultimate pan-Arab hero and charismatic leader. Nasrallah and Hizbullah supported the 
uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and particularly in Bahrain which has a large Shiite population 
that had been for long marginalised by the ruling Sunnis. However, Hizbullah‟s and 
Nasrallah‟s support for the Syrian regime in its repression of the popular uprising dented his 
credibility and image as an organic leader with support in mass culture. In order to appeal to 
his supporters, Nasrallah used the anti-nationalist and anti-resistance frame to refer to the 
Syrian uprising, a frame the Syrian regime also used to mobilise support.
    
   
At the beginning of 2013, and after a period of staying out of the limelight which 
sparked rumours he had been taken to Iran for treatment of cancer, Nasrallah began to divert 
attention from Hizbullah and the Syrian crisis to local Lebanese politics, while emphasising 
Hizbullah‟s rootedness in Lebanon, its determination to avert sectarian strife and its 
involvement in the domestic political processes. In a speech on 27 February 2013 (Nasrallah, 
2013a), he proposed a new electoral law based on proportional representation as the 
alternative for the country ahead of parliamentary elections that were planned for June 2013 
and repeated Hizbullah‟s support for this law in another speech on 6 March 2013. In a speech 
to justify Hizbullah‟s intervention in Syria on 13 June 2013, Nasrallah referred to the Syrian 
opposition as the takfīriyinn (the infidels) - a term used to describe Islamist forces opposed to 
the Syrian regime and Hizbullah's influence in Lebanon- and used the frame of resistance 
against Israel and its allies to defend the engagement of Hizbullah fighters in a battle outside 
Lebanese soil: “…We (Hizbullah) consider that the takeover of these groups of Syria, or a 
number of Syrian provinces especially those bordering Lebanon as posing a great danger to 
Lebanon and the Lebanese people and not only Hizbullah” (Nasrallah, 2013b).  
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          Since his appointment in 1992 and up to the end of 2011, Hizbullah‟s mediation of 
Nasrallah‟s „image of presence‟ had succeeded in creating a charismatic landscape and a 
response to his image in popular culture. However, Hizbullah‟s support for the Syrian  regime 
against a popular uprising at a time when support for people power in the Arab world was at 
its height only served to dent his „image of presence‟ and charismatic authority, thus showing 
the challenges to and limits of processes of mediation and self-mediation in particular 
historical junctures contexts. This paper has concerned itself with addressing the cultivation 
and mediation of Nasrallah‟s image over time. As such, it did not discuss the negative media 
campaigns waged against Hizbullah and Nasrallah in the regional Arab media. In fact, these 
campaigns, particularly in Gulf-financed media platforms, had also played a role in 
subverting his image. This paper has argued that a charismatic response cannot be discussed 
without paying attention to the cultivation, maintenance and validation of image in the media 
age or to the fine balance between potential opportunities and structural constraints. It has 
also shown the limits of mediation processes and the transitory nature of Nasrallah‟s 
charismatic authority, underlining the symbiotic relationship between image of presence in 
particular historical junctures. 
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